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ABSTRACT
Password guessers are instrumental for assessing the strength of
passwords. Despite their diversity and abundance, little is known
about how different guessers compare to each other. We perform
in-depth analyses and comparisons of the guessing abilities and
behavior of password guessers. To extend analyses beyond number
of passwords cracked, we devise an analytical framework to com-
pare the types of passwords that guessers generate under various
conditions (e.g., limited training data, limited number of guesses,
and dissimilar training and target data). Our results show that
guessers often produce dissimilar guesses, even when trained on
the same data. We leverage this result to show that combinations of
computationally-cheap guessers are as effective as computationally-
intensive guessers, but more efficient. Our insights allow us to pro-
vide a concrete set of recommendations for system administrators
when performing password checking.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Authentication.
KEYWORDS
Reactive Password Checking, Password Cracking, Password Au-
diting, Security Tools, Password Guessing, Password Guessers, Pass-
words.
1 INTRODUCTION
Passwords are presently the most common form of user authenti-
cation, providing the first layer of defense in most systems. User
authentication aims to confirm a user’s claimed identity, typically
by something the user knows (e.g., a password), something they
have (e.g., a mobile device), or something they are (e.g., a fingerprint
biometric).
Despite decades of research into more secure authentication
methods, passwords remain dominant mainly due to their ease to
implement and familiarity to most users [5].
Password systems, in spite of their popularity, suffer from many
security issues as passwords are mistakenly given to attackers
[43], reused across accounts [9], and cracked by guessing attacks
[4, 13, 30, 34, 36, 49, 51, 55]. Recent password data breaches [24]
and their availability to attackers have worsened password security
by fueling more effective guessing attacks.
To protect against password guessing attacks, administrators
are advised to perform password checking, either proactively at the
time of password creation or reactively through attempting to crack
their own password databases [3]. While there are many password
guessing methods and tools available, the system administrator’s
choice of guessing tools is critical for effective password checking.
However, there is considerable uncertainty as to which guessers to
use, in a particular use case, as the only available data regarding
password guessing behavior is their success rate under disparate
benchmarks.
Tomake an informed decision, an administrator must understand
how password guessers behave, compare to, and complement each
other under different conditions. Unfortunately, the literature lacks
both an analytical framework for studying guessers’ behaviors and
studies involving comparisons of many guessers’ behaviors under
varied conditions.
To put password guessers “under a microscope,” we first cre-
ate an analytical framework to reveal insights into their behavior
and their ability to complement and substitute each other. Using
this framework, we analyze a number of well-studied and popular
password guessing tools and training password datasets to reveal
important practical insights.
Our analyses demonstrate that guessers offer various levels of
generalizability, and their success rates are more closely related to
the similarity between training and testing datasets than training
dataset size. Our results also show that guessers often generate dis-
similar guesses, which can be leveraged for more effective password
checking. We show how administrators can get more bang for their
buck by using combinations of computationally-cheap guessers that,
when used together, are as effective as computationally-intensive
guessers, but more efficient (i.e., run faster).
A key take-away from our analysis is that the value of a password
guesser is not only in its success rate, but also in its ability to com-
plement other guessers. Our findings allow us to provide concrete
recommendations for system administrators performing password
checking. Our analytical framework serves future password re-
search as well as practitioners for understanding new guessing
tools’ behavior, and their ability to complement or substitute other
existing guessers.
2 RELATEDWORK
Passwords are often the first line of defense in protecting our confi-
dential information. Unfortunately, it has been repeatedly shown
that user passwords are often similar or identical, and are conse-
quently guessable by an adversary [4, 7, 31, 32]. In this section,
we review some security concerns with passwords, their counter-
measures, and finally how our work fits into the literature.
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Patterns in Passwords. Many users adopt common strategies for
creating their passwords to help them remember their passwords.
However, these strategies leave behind specific patterns, which
often make passwords more guessable. These patterns include key-
board patterns [40], distribution of character classes (or password
structures) [54], replacement of letters with resembling characters
(e.g., e to 3) [26], popular topics (e.g., love) [49] and dates [50].
Reuse of Passwords. Password reuse weakens password strength.
When a password is reused across multiple accounts, the breach of
a password in one account could lead to a breach of other accounts.
The average password is used for approximately 6 different websites
[14], and 77% of users either reuse or modify an existing password
[9]. These reused passwords have been exploited in targeted at-
tacks (i.e., against a single target user), with success ranging from
16% in 1000 guesses [36] to 32-73% in 100 guesses when personal
information is also incorporated [51] .
Password Composition Policies. To prevent users from selecting
weak passwords, many systems implement password composition
policies—sets of rules that a new acceptable password must follow.
Common examples of composition policies include a minimum
password length and/or the inclusion of characters from multiple
character classes (e.g., lowercase, uppercase, numbers, special char-
acters). Despite their practical benefit in strengthening selected
passwords [30, 42], overly strict password policies push users to
insecure behaviors [6, 25, 30] including writing down passwords
[25], reusing passwords [6, 30], or extending a weak password with
a special character [30]. Partly due to this usability shortfall, many
social-media websites, which are often targets of attacks, choose to
adopt less restrictive policies [15].
Password Meters. Password meters, by estimating the strength of
passwords during creation, encourage users to create stronger pass-
words [46]. However, most of the heuristic-based meters used in
practice don’t accurately reflect actual password strength [11]. Re-
cent developments focus on various approaches, such as advanced
heuristics-based methods [56], probabilistic methods (e.g., Markov
model) [7], and neural networks [34, 36, 45]. Proposals based on
neural networks, Markov models, and PCFGs have been found to
outperform others [19]. Also, password meters can be personalized
either by taking into account a user’s personal information (e.g.,
user profile [27] or previously-leaked passwords [36]) in measuring
the password strength, or by providing personalized feedback for
password strength improvement [45].
Password Guessing Tools. Administrators are often recommended to
preemptively assess the strength of the passwords in their systems.
For reactive checking, administrators perform simulated guessing
attacks on their own systems to assess the strength of passwords
against potential attacks. An administrator can benefit from many
widely-studied guessing tools and techniques. Markov models have
been promising in password guessing [13, 35]. Probabilistic context-
free grammars (PCFGs) [55] (and its extensions [23, 53]) create
grammar structure-based password guesses, and has been widely-
used (see, for example [4, 7, 9, 29, 32, 46]). The semantic guesser
[49] expanded PCFGs to exploit semantic patterns in passwords.
Recently, neural network guessers have drawn considerable attention
[22, 34]. The use of multiple guessers has been proposed to measure
password strength [47]. Many password guessers are required to be
carefully tuned on training datasets to effectively guess passwords
of target dataset. It has been shown that some password guessers
are sensitive to language differences in training data [28], and the
similarity between training and target datasets improves guessing
success [27].
We note that system administrators need tomakemany decisions
to implement effective password checking. These decisions include
which subset of guessing tools to choose among many available
options, how to train them, which training dataset to choose, etc. To
support these decisions, the literature falls short in systematically
understanding guesser behaviors and their ability to complement
or substitute one another. This work attempts to address this gap.
We focus on developing metrics and statistics to aid understanding
password guessers (both present and future), to facilitate the work
and decision making of administrators for password checking.
3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Our primary objective is to gain a deeper understanding of pass-
word guesser behavior by comparing the actual password guesses
produced by each guesser.
We consider a set of m password guessers G = {д1, . . . ,дm }
where each дi represents a specific guesser (e.g., John the Ripper,
OMEN, etc.). We aim to understand how each guesser дi ∈ G
behaves when trained on or tested against particular password
datasets, what types of passwords they guess, and how similar one
guesser’s behavior is to others. To this end, each guesser д ∈ G
will be trained on and tested against a set of n password datasets
D = {D1, ...,Dn }, where each D j is a publicly-available password
dataset (e.g., RockYou, Twitter, etc.).1 When a guesser дi ∈ G is
trained on a dataset D j ∈ D, it can create a password guess list
Li j . To compare various guessers trained on various datasets, we
develop some statistics (see Section 3.3) for comparing guessers’
guess lists. Our statistics deploy some pairwise-comparison metrics
(see Section 3.2), which use either structural features (see Section
3.1) or the passwords shared between two lists.
3.1 Password Features
For each passwordw , we extract two structural features: password
length nw (i.e., the number of its characters) and the number of char-
acter classes cw that it contains. We focus on four distinct character
classes: lowercase letters, uppercase letters, numbers, and symbols.
For instance, w = passw0rd! has nw = 9 and cw = 3 with three
character classes: lowercase letter, number, and symbol.
To extract features from password list L′ (e.g., leaked password
database or guess list of a guesser), we first aggregate the extracted
features of allw ∈ L′ into a matrix V = [vxy ] wherevxy is the frac-
tion of passwords in password list L′ which contains y characters
covering x character classes:
vxy =
1
|L′ |
∑
w ∈L′
1[cw = x & nw = y], (1)
1We use the terminology of “testing against a dataset” when a guesser is guessing the
passwords of a target password dataset.
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where 1[.] is the indicator function, and |L′ | represents the number
of passwords in the list.2 The matrix V has a natural probability
interpretation: when one selects a passwordw from the password
list L′ uniformly at random, the passwordw contains y characters
from x character classes with a probability of vxy . In other words,
ourmatrixV captures the joint probability distribution of passwords
over character classes and the number of characters. To ease our
notations and analyses, we collapse (i.e., flatten) the matrix V into
a feature vector v. We refer to this feature vector as the structural
features of a password list. This simple representation allows us to
preserve the impact of password policies of each password list.
3.2 Pairwise Comparison Metrics
Our deployed pairwise comparison metrics are symmetric, so are
computed once for each pair of password lists. While these metrics
can use any features, we use either the structural features described
in Section 3.1 or the passwords shared between two lists. Our met-
rics have been widely used in information retrieval [1, 17, 41], data
mining [2, 12], and other password research [27].
3.2.1 Cosine Similarity. Cosine similarity measures the angle be-
tween two non-zero vectors. For comparison of two password lists,
one can extract structural features from each list, and then use the
cosine similarity on the corresponding feature vectors. The cosine
similarity between two password lists A and B is given by
C(A,B) = vA · vB∥vA∥∥vB∥ , (2)
where vA and vB are structural feature vectors of A and B, respec-
tively. ∥.∥ is the Euclidean norm, and vA · vB is the dot product of
those two vectors. The closer the cosine similarity value is to 1, the
smaller the angle between the two vectors is, and the more similar
they are. In other words, two lists of passwords with similar feature
distributions have a high cosine similarity. We use cosine similarity
combined with our proposed structural features for two purposes:
(i) comparing the structure of leaked password databases with each
other; (ii) comparing the structure of two guess lists.
3.2.2 Jaccard Index. Jaccard index measures the extent two sets
overlap with each other, where the intersection of two sets is com-
pared to their union. The Jaccard index between two password lists
A and B can be computed by
J (A,B) = |A ∩ B ||A ∪ B | . (3)
The closer the Jaccard index is to 1, the closer in size the intersec-
tion of the sets is to their union, and consequently the more similar
two sets are. In other words, two sets of passwords with a high
amount of overlap will have a high Jaccard index. The Jaccard index
also has a natural probabilistic interpretation: if one chooses a pass-
word uniformly at random from either password lists, the Jaccard
index captures the likelihood of selecting a password belonging to
both sets.
When password lists have duplicates (e.g., leaked password
datasets), we view the password list as a multiset, a modification
of sets that allows for duplicated elements. In these cases, we ap-
ply a generalized version of the Jaccard index [27] to preserve the
2Indicator function 1[s] returns 1 if the statement s is true; otherwise 0.
frequency information of password duplicates in password lists.
Letting f (w,A) be the number of occurrences of passwordw in pass-
word list A, the generalized Jaccard index between two password
lists A and B is given by
J (A,B) =
∑
w ∈U min (f (w,A), f (w,B))∑
w ∈U max (f (w,A), f (w,B))
, (4)
whereU = A ∪ B.
3.3 Statistics
Our comparison metrics can be readily used for the comparison
of a pair of password lists. However, to compare two guessers
thoroughly, it is useful to summarize the comparison metrics of
two guessers under different settings (e.g., under different training
and testing datasets). This section explains our proposed statistics
for summarizing comparison metrics. Our statistics fall into two
categories.
3.3.1 Statistics for Guessing Behaviors. This class of statistics is
devised to either compare the guessing behaviors of password
guessers with each other, or measure how different training datasets
affect the guessing behavior of a given guesser.
Our guessing similarity statistic summarizes the similarity of two
guessers’ guess lists when trained on the same dataset by averaging
the comparison metric (e.g, Jaccard or Cosine) of their guess lists
over various training datasets. We calculate the guessing similarity
of two guessers дi and дj by
G(дi ,дj ,M) = 1
n
n∑
k=1
M(Lik ,Ljk ) (5)
whereM ∈ {C, J } is either Cosine similarity (see Eq. 2) or Jaccard
index (see Eq. 3), and Lik is the list of password guesses (without
any duplicates) generated by дi trained on datasets Dk . Here, n is
the number of datasets in D. We also introduce successful guessing
similarity to measure how two guessers’ successful guesses are
similar:
SG(дi ,дj ,M) = 1
n(n − 1)
n∑
k=1
n∑
ℓ,k
M
(
Lik ∩ Dℓ ,Ljk ∩ Dℓ
)
. (6)
Onemight be interested inmeasuring how similarly two different
password datasets can train guessers. To this end, we introduce our
training similarity statistic which calculates the extent two different
training password datasets result in generating similar guess lists
of passwords when used for training. We define training similarity
between two datasets D j and Dk by
T (D j ,Dk ,M) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
M(Li j ,Lik ), (7)
where m is the number of different guessers in G. This formula
computes how similarly D j and Dk can train guessers on average.
By capturing the extent two various datasets are effectively similar
in training guessers, one can identify training datasets which are
as effective as another dataset in training guessers. This could be
used to identify effective, yet small datasets, which could drastically
speed up the training process.
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3.3.2 Statistics for Guessing Success. The guessing success statistics
quantify the guessing accuracy of guessers under various settings
(e.g., training and testing datasets), and also determine how training
data affects guessing success for various guessers.
When each guesser дi is trained on password dataset D j and
tested against password dataset Dk , one can compute its success
rate, as the portion of successfully guessed passwords, by
si jk =
|Li j ∩ Dk |
|Dk |
. (8)
Note that si jk ∈ [0, 1], where si jk = 1 implies that all passwords
in Dk are guessed successfully by дi trained on D j . To summarize
the success rate for a specific guesser дi , one can compute its mean
success rate over all distinct training and testing datasets by
⟨si ::⟩ = 1
n(n − 1)
n∑
j=1
n∑
k,j
si jk . (9)
We similarly compute the success rate of training dataset D j by〈
s:j :
〉
=
1
m(n − 1)
m∑
i=1
n∑
k,j
si jk , (10)
and the average success rate of a fixed dataset D j and guesser дi by〈
si j :
〉
=
1
n − 1
n∑
k,j
si jk . (11)
4 EXPERIMENTS
Our experiments aim to understand the impact of training dataset
choice on guessers, the performance of guessers, the behavior of
guessers in relation to one another, and how guessers can comple-
ment or substitute one another.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We choose a variety of different password datasets and guessers.
4.1.1 Password Datasets. Our experiments use a variety of publicly
available leaked password datasets, which have been the subject of
other password research studies (for example, [9, 18, 51, 52, 54, 57]).
We have curated and cleaned these datasets by converting their
passwords to Unicode. Table 1 shows the number of total and unique
passwords in each dataset as well as the ratio between those values.3
4.1.2 Password Guessers. We focus on six guessers from three
different classes of password guessers: Markov models, Probabilistic
Context Free Grammars (PCFGs), and Neural Networks.
John the Ripper (JtR-Markov). We use its community build (1.9.0-
bleeding-jumbo) [37] in Markov mode. We also restrict the maxi-
mum length of passwords to 12 characters, which we determined
to provide the best results and is consistent with other studies [49].
JtR runs single-threaded during both training and guessing.
Ordered Markov Enumerator (OMEN). We use OMEN [13, 38] with
the default settings. OMEN produces only ASCII passwords and
runs single-threaded during training and guessing.
3We exclusively use publicly available datasets and don’t report any specific password
information. Thus, there is no risk of exposing private user information. We keep only
the passwords with no links to their original owner.
Number of Passwords
Datasets Total Unique Ratio Type
ClixSense [20] 2,222,359 1,628,205 0.7326 Plaintext
Webhost [16] 15,292,021 10,589,775 0.6925 Plaintext
Mate1 [39] 27,403,932 11,988,154 0.4375 Plaintext
RockYou [8] 32,596,319 14,337,716 0.4399 Plaintext
Fling [10] 40,769,652 16,810,091 0.4123 Plaintext
Twitter [44] 40,872,901 22,579,065 0.5524 Plaintext
Merged* 159,157,184 67,628,637 0.4249 Plaintext
LinkedIn [21] 174,243,105 61,829,207 0.3548 Hashed
Table 1: The password datasets, their sizes, and the ratio be-
tween unique and total number of passwords. *Merged con-
tains all other plaintext datasets in this table.
Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar (PCFGv4). We used PCFG ver-
sion 4.0 [53], an extension of the original PCFG [55]. This version
uses OMEN to generate a certain percentage of passwords and
generate the remainder with PCFGs. We have disabled this fea-
ture to generate passwords exclusively from PCFGv4 as the use
of OMEN decreased the success rate in most tests. PCFGv4 runs
single-threaded.
Semantic Guesser (Sem). We use the lite version of Sem [48, 49].
The grammars are trained using maximum likelihood estimation,
the backoff algorithm is used for producing tags, and mangling
rules are enabled for generating guesses. Sem uses multiprocessing
during training, but runs single threaded for guessing.
Neural Network (NN).We generate guesses using the NN’s “human”
mode [33, 34]. We limit the length of passwords to 6–40 characters,
and sort the generated passwords in descending probability order.
Due to our large datasets, we use a larger model, consisting of three
LSTM layers (with 1024 neurons each) and two dense layers (with
512 neurons each), which outperformed the original default model
in our preliminary tests. The neural network is our only guesser
that uses GPU resources along with CPU. The neural network runs
multi-threaded during training and guessing.
Identity Guesser (ID). This guesser takes a training dataset as input,
removes its duplicates, and outputs its unique passwords in the
descending order of their frequency in the training dataset. In other
words, this guesser computes the empirical probability distribution
of the passwords in the training dataset (i.e., training phase), then
outputs the passwords from the highest to the lowest probability
(i.e., generation phase). This simple guesser is a valuable benchmark
for understanding how well other guessers learn and generalize.
4.2 Impact of Training Data Choice
We investigate how guessing success rates are impacted by different
aspects of training data.
We train all six password guessers on each of the six individ-
ual plaintext datasets and test them against every other plaintext
dataset, yielding 180 password cracking scenarios. For all guessers,
we set the cutoff to 300 million guesses.
Figure 1 captures the average success rates for various pairs of
training and testing datasets. One can make two important obser-
vations: (i) some datasets (e.g., Twitter, Mate1) are more effective
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Twier
RockYou
ClixSense
Webhost
Mate1
Fling
Figure 1: The average success rates over all guessers for train-
ing and testing dataset pairs. The edges are directed clock-
wise from training to testing dataset, with colors matching
the training dataset color. The edge width is proportional to
the average success rate of guessers for a fixed training and
testing dataset pair. The node size shows the dataset size.
ClixSense Webhost Mate1 RockYou Fling Twitter
33.73% 29.60% 38.16% 30.26% 35.15% 42.81%
Table 2: Mean success rates for training password datasets.
Datasets are ordered smallest to largest from left to right.
training data than others (e.g., Webhost); (ii) some pairs of datasets
are effective for training and testing against each other, i.e., when
one dataset can train guessers well against another dataset (e.g.,
RockYou-Mate1, ClixSense-Mate1, etc.). These two observations
motivate us towards a deeper analysis of the characteristics of
effective training datasets.
4.2.1 Size of training dataset. We ask whether the success rate of
a guesser, on average, increases with the size of training dataset.
Table 2 shows the average success rates of each training dataset
over all guessers and target datasets (computed by Eq. 10), with
datasets ordered from smallest to largest size. While our largest
dataset performs the best, our smallest dataset ClixSense outper-
forms both Webhost and RockYou, which are over six and fifteen
times larger than it respectively. For a formal analysis, we calcu-
lated the statistical correlation between the number of passwords
in the training dataset and the averaged success rate. The resulting
Pearson coefficient of 0.189 (p= 0.315) suggests insignificant corre-
lation between training dataset size and success rate. This result
suggests that while size of training dataset might play a role in
success rate, it is not the sole influential factor.
4.2.2 Similarity between training and target datasets. We next focus
on how the similarity between training and target datasets impacts
the success rate of guessers. We first compute the cosine similarity
and generalized Jaccard index (see Eq. 2 and Eq. 4) between pass-
word datasets, and then explore the relationship of these similarities
with success rates.
Figure 2a shows that that Mate1, Twitter, RockYou and ClixSense
have high structural password similarity (i.e., cosine similarity).
Fling and Webhost are dissimilar to other datasets, but similar
to each other. Figure 2b suggests that the exact overlap between
datasets (i.e., generalized Jaccard similarity) is often low with ex-
ceptions for larger datasets (i.e., Fling, Twitter, RockYou and Mate1),
likely due to their sizes.
The cross-examination of Figures 1, 2a, and 2b suggest the datasets
with higher similarity tend to have mutually higher success rates
(e.g., Mate1 and RockYou share high similarity and mutual success
rates). Thus, we hypothesize that the similarity between training
and testing datasets has a positive effect on success rate. To test this
hypothesis, we ran Pearson statistical tests between the similarity
metric of any ordered pair of datasets and their success rates. Our
cosine similarity and Jaccard metric have correlation coefficients of
0.597 (p = 0.00049) and 0.596 (p = 0.00049) respectively. Both are
significant and large by Cohen’s convention. This further confirms
that dataset similarity, structural (cosine) or overlap (Jaccard), is
a key factor in success rate. These results complement previous
findings [27] on the relationship between the similarity of training
and testing datasets and guesser success rates.4
4.2.3 Training similarity between datasets. The surprising perfor-
mance of ClixSense in Table 2, despite its small size, raises the
question of how similarly ClixSense and a bigger dataset can train
a guesser, as smaller training datasets are desirable to reduce train-
ing time. So, we next explore how similarly two datasets can train
a guesser using our notion of training similarity (see Eq. 7). We
exclude the Identity guesser in this analysis due to its simplicity in
learning; also, its results mirror dataset similarity (see 4.2.2).
Figures 2c and 2d demonstrate the cosine and Jaccard training
similarity between our datasets. The cosine training similarity is
relatively high between most pairs of datasets. The cluster of Rock-
You, Twitter, Mate1, and ClixSense share relatively high overlap of
generated passwords (see their pairwise Jaccard training similar-
ity). This means passwords generated from training with ClixSense,
despite its small size, have high overlap with passwords generated
from training with other datasets. In contrast, the Jaccard training
similarity between Fling or Webhost and any other datasets is rela-
tively low, indicating that they may be better to combine with other
datasets for training purposes.
Cross-examining Figures 2a–d, illustrates the relationship be-
tween dataset similarity and training similarity. When two datasets
have low structural (cosine) or overlap (Jaccard) similarity, their
training similarity is notably higher (e.g., Mate1-Webhost, ClixSense-
Fling, Twitter-Webhost, etc.). These observations could be partly
explained by guessers converging towards generating passwords
with common patterns as they generalize from the training data.
4.3 Guesser Performance
To evaluate the performance of guessers, we compute their average
success rate and runtime across varied training data, target data,
and password guessing scenarios (i.e., online and offline attacks).
4This is our only experiment with partial overlap with other work [27] by computing
cosine similarity and Jaccard index between datasets; however, we not only use a
different set of datasets and guessers, but also our features for cosine similarity differ,
and we use Jaccard index between datasets rather than between their features.
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Webhost ClixSense
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(a) The cosine similarity.
RockYou Twitter
Webhost ClixSense
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0.263
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(b) The generalized Jaccard index.
RockYou Twitter
Webhost ClixSense
Fling Mate1
0.981
0.451
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(c) The cosine training similarity.
RockYou Twitter
Webhost ClixSense
Fling Mate1
0.263
0.021
Jaccard In
dex
(d) The Jaccard training similarity.
Figure 2: Plaintext datasets with their pairwise (a) cosine similarity, (b) generalized Jaccard similarity, (c) cosine training simi-
larity, and (d) Jaccard training similarity. The training similarity between datasets is computed by Eq. 7. The edge weights and
colors are based on the corresponding metric value between two datasets. The node color captures the metric average for the
corresponding dataset. The node size is proportional to the dataset size.
Guesser Success Rate@1M Success Rate@300M
Identity 23.238 (11.859) 30.519 (14.079)
JtR-Markov 0.665 (0.993) 27.591 (11.563)
OMEN 5.921 (3.225) 22.121 (10.749)
Sem 18.219 (10.344) 41.343 (13.274)
PCFGv4 23.551 (11.545) 47.397 (12.364)
NN 17.662 (11.585) 40.768 (19.734)
Table 3: Guessers’ mean success rates at 1 Million and 300
Million guesses (standard deviations in parenthesis). The
two best and worst are highlighted with green and red, resp.
4.3.1 Guessing Success Rate. To gauge the average performance of
each guesser, we train and test every guesser on each possible pair
of non-merged plaintext datasets. Then, each guesser generates
guess lists at cutoffs of 1 million and 300 million guesses to simulate
online and limited offline attacks, respectively. Table 3 shows the
mean success rate of each guesser, computed by Eq. 9. At onemillion
guesses, PCFGv4 and Identity outperform others, while JtR-Markov
and OMEN perform the worst. Notably, only PCFGv4 is able to
outperform Identity at this cutoff with a negligible margin.
For three-hundred million guesses, PCFGv4 performs the best,
with a 6% lead over the second best guesser Sem. The Identity
guesser performs surprisingly well, with an average of 30.5% (but
a high standard deviation of 14.07%) in at most 21,653,268 guesses
(compared to 300 million guesses for other guessers).5 In its best
case, the Identity guesser trained on Twitter guesses 56.7% of Rock-
You, only 10.14% lower than the best guesser PCFGv4 on that same
pair. The Identity guesser’s high success rate arises from a rela-
tively large overlap between datasets, observed in Figure 2b. OMEN
under-performs JtR-Markov, performing worst overall at this cutoff.
4.3.2 Average Runtime. To help a system administrator understand
the resource requirements of guessers, we next analyze their run-
times during training and guess list creation. Each guesser is trained
and generates guesses on the same GPU-accelerated server which
ran no other jobs. The server has 2 Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6148 CPUs
with 80 total cores @ 2.40GHz and 4 Nvidia GeForce 1080 Ti GPUs.
We note that only the neural network benefits from multiple GPUs
to parallelize computations.
5The upperbound for number of guesses in the Identity guesser is derived from the
maximum number of unique passwords in our datasets.
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Training
Guesser 1 Million 50 Million Generation
JtR-Markov 00h 00m 00.1s 00d 00h 00m 02.2s 00h 00m 33s
Identity 00h 00m 00.3s 00d 00h 00m 24.9s 00h 00m 18s
OMEN 00h 00m 03.0s 00d 00h 00m 23.0s 00h 07m 10s
Sem 00h 01m 38.3s 00d 00h 20m 14.6s 00h 55m 30s
PCFGv4 00h 03m 49.5s 00d 01h 03m 38.4s 00h 30m 58s
NN 01h 18m 08.0s 02d 17h 01m 49.0s 19h 44m 20s
Table 4: Guesser training and generation time. Both datasets
are of different size and randomly sampled from theMerged
Dataset. Guessers (except Identity) generated 300M guesses.
Identity OMEN JtR-Markov Sem NN PCFGv4
15.378% 15.664% 30.265% 33.099% 39.585% 43.618%
Table 5: Guessers’ generalizability, with 300M guess cutoff.
A higher success rate indicates a better ability to generalize.
Table 4 reports guesser training and generation time. For train-
ing, we created two datasets by sampling 1 million and 50 million
passwords from the Merged dataset.6 For each guesser, the train-
ing time increases with the training dataset size. Markov-based
guessers and Identity perform the fastest (< 25 sec. for 50 million),
with PCFGs taking longer (about one hour for 50 million) and the
neural network taking the longest (more than 2.5 days for 50 mil-
lion). For password generation, we observe that Identity guesser
and Markov models are again by far the fastest. Note that the Iden-
tity guesser only produced approximately 67M guesses, almost 4.5
times fewer guesses than produced by others. The NN is consider-
ably slower than others: 2100 times slower than JTR-Markov, and
even 39 times slower than PCFGv4.
4.4 Guesser Behaviors
We investigate the behavior of each guesser (i.e., their generated
guess lists) under various training and target datasets. We also
explore how each guesser complements and substitutes others.
4.4.1 Generalizability. One important characteristic of guessers is
how well they can generalize, i.e., predict and generate previously
unseen passwords. To measure this, we train each guesser on the
Webhost dataset as it is the least similar to the other datasets, both in
terms of structure (see Figure 2a) and actual password overlap (see
Figure 2b). We then test the Webhost trained guessers against every
other dataset and calculate each guesser’s mean success rate. Table
5 shows the mean success rate of each guesser: PCFGv4 and NN
outperform others, demonstrating a relatively high degree of gen-
eralizability compared to others. The Identity guesser and OMEN
perform notably worse. This is expected for the Identity guesser
with its inability to generalize, but surprising for OMEN. There is a
notable amount of variance in the success rates of guessers with
similar approaches: 15% difference between Markov models JtR and
OMEN, and 10% difference between PCFG-based guessers PCFGv4
and Sem. This highlights how even guessers with similar underlying
approaches can display differing generalization behavior.
6Our code for training the identity guesser (i.e., computing empirical distribution of
unique passwords) and its guess generation (i.e., sorting passwords based on their
probabilities) is written in Python without any optimization.
Training Dataset Size
Guessers 1 Million 10 Million 30 Million
Identity 21.194% 33.441% 39.853%
JtR 27.570% 27.541% 27.527%
OMEN 29.077% 29.216% 29.461%
Sem 41.493% 46.910% 48.021%
PCFGv4 41.517% 48.719% 51.178%
NN 43.688% 56.500% 58.259%
Table 6: The mean percentage of passwords guessed by each
guesser when trained on different-sized subset of Twitter
with a cutoff of 300M.
4.4.2 Sensitivity to Training Size. We intend to learn how each
guesser’s success rate is impacted by the size of training data, drawn
from the same distribution. Sampling from the Twitter dataset, we
create three different datasets of sizes 1 million, 10 million and 30
million. After training guessers on each dataset, we generate guess
lists at a cutoff of 300M and test them against all other datasets.
Table 6 reports the mean success rates by Eq. 11. All guessers (ex-
cept JtR-Markov) improve when trained on the larger dataset, but
to various extents. The Identity guesser has the most drastic im-
provement with training size growth, from 21.2% to 39.85%. OMEN
and JtR-Markov show the least improvement. Sem, PCFGv4, and
NN have more modest, but notable improvements, increasing their
success rates by 6.5%, 9.7%, and 14.6%, respectively.
4.4.3 Guessing Similarity. Using our notion of guessing similarity
(see Eq. 5), we analyze how similar the guess lists of two guessers are
when they are trained on the same training data. Figure 3 shows the
cosine and Jaccard guessing similarity between guessers at cutoffs
of 1 million and 300 million guesses. For both cutoffs, PCFGv4, Sem,
ID and NN share high structural (cosine) similarity when compared
to OMEN and JtR (see Figure 3a and Figure 3c). Interestingly, despite
both deploying a Markov approach, JtR and OMEN are dissimilar.
Figures 3b and 3d show Jaccard guessing similarity between
guessers, capturing the overlap of guessers’ guesses, at both cutoffs.
Guessers with higher success rate (see Table 3) seem to have higher
Jaccard guessing similarity (or overlap): At 1 million, the two best
guessers PCFGv4 and ID share the highest overlap whereas PCFGv4,
Sem and NN with the highest success rates at 300 million have
highest overlaps. One can also readily observe that the Jaccard
guessing similarities decrease as the cutoff increases. This change
suggests that by generating more passwords, each guesser has
begun demonstrating their own unique guessing behavior (i.e., the
% overlap between guessers’ guess lists decreases).
4.4.4 Successful guessing similarity. Our guessing similarity analy-
ses showed that guessers trained on the same data, generate mostly
unique guesses (see Figures 3b and 3d). However, it is possible
that many of these unique guesses are unsuccessful. In this light,
one might be interested in measuring the uniqueness of successful
guesses between guessers. To achieve this, we use our successful
guessing similarity (see Eq. 6) with generalized Jaccard index.7
As shown in Figure 4, there is still a considerable degree of
uniqueness in successful guesses. Even, Sem and PCFGv4 with
7The generalized Jaccard allows us to weight the successful guesses of each guesser
based on their frequencies in the target dataset.
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NN
OMEN
PCFGv4
JtR-Markov
Sem
Identity
(a) Cosine guessing similarity with 1 million guesses.
NN
OMEN
PCFGv4
JtR-Markov
Sem
Identity
(b) Jaccard guessing similarity with 1 million guesses.
NN
OMEN
PCFGv4
JtR-Markov
Sem
Identity
(c) Cosine guessing similarity with 300 million guesses
NN
OMEN
PCFGv4
JtR-Markov
Sem
Identity
(d) Jaccard guessing similarity with 300 million guesses.
Figure 3: The cosine and Jaccard guessing similarity (see Eq. 5) between guessers at the cutoffs of 1 million or 300 million
guesses. The edge colors represent the similarity value between two guessers. The edge width further highlights the relative
similarities within a figure (thickermeansmore similar). The node size represents the guesser’s average success rate. The node
colors represent their average similarity.
NN
OMEN
PCFGv4
JtR-Markov
Sem
Identity
0.866
0.451
Jaccard In
dex
Figure 4: The generalized Jaccard successful guessing simi-
larity between guessers. The edge weights and colors repre-
sent the similarity of two guessers. The node size represents
the guesser’s average success rate. The node color represents
the guesser’s average similarity with other guessers.
the highest similarity have a generalized Jaccard index of 0.86,
implying that 14% of their successful guesses are unique to one
guesser. Similarly, NN and Sem, by sharing 72% of their successful
guesses, owe 28% their success to unique passwords. Interestingly,
the Identity guesser seems to have moderate Jaccard similarity with
any other guesser (i.e., its similarity values range from 0.529 to
0.725) despite its smaller guess lists sizes (i.e., ranging from 2.2
million to 40 million compared to 300 million for all other guessers).
These findings offer two important recommendations: (i) the use
of one guesser does not make another guesser entirely redundant,
even when the underlying approach or achieved success rates are
similar; (ii) The cost-effective Identity guesser can complement
any other guessers as it has a relatively high number of successful
guesses. Thus, a system administrator might benefit from applying
two or more different guessers for improved password checking.
We explore this possibility in our combination attack discussed
below in Section 4.5.2.
4.5 Combining Guessers
We evaluate the ability of password guessers to complement one
another on a previously unseen dataset (i.e., LinkedIn) in an of-
fline attack scenario. We begin in Section 4.5.1 by evaluating each
individual guesser against the LinkedIn dataset. Next we analyze
different combinations of guessers in Section 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Individual Guessers. To compare guessers’ performance, we
train each guesser on the Merged dataset, and allow them to each
make 2 billion guesses against the LinkedIn dataset. As reported in
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OMEN JtR-Markov Identity Sem PCFGv4 NN
35.641% 37.028% 47.561% 55.159% 58.798% 63.145%
Table 7: Percentage of LinkedIn passwords successfully
guessed. Guessers are trained on theMerged dataset and cut-
off at 2 billion guesses.
Figure 5: Performance of guessers trained on the Merged
dataset and tested against LinkedIn. The dotted line marks
the Identity guesser’s last guess at 67 million guesses, each
other guesser made 2 billion guesses.
Table 7, NN outperforms all others, with a 4.3% lead over PCFGv4.
PCFG-based (PCFGv4 and Sem) and Identity guessers outperform
Markov-based guessers (OMEN and JTR-Markov). Figure 5 depicts
the percentage of guessed passwords over the number of guesses.
JtR-Markov surpasses OMEN close to the end of the attack. Notably,
PCFGv4, Identity, and NN traded places for the best guesser before
Identity ran out of guesses. We next apply our findings from our
successful guess similarity experiments to further improve the
results using combination attacks.
4.5.2 Combination Attacks. Our analyses shed light on how guessers
complement others by generating unique successful guesses. We
also learn that the Identity guesser not only complements every
other guesser, but also often outperforms some advanced guessers.
These findings motivate us to design a combination attack where
the Identity guesser is used to attack a password dataset prior to
the application of a set of other guessers. This hybrid approach is
recommended in John the Ripper where a traditional attack follows
wordlist mode. We run many independent combination attacks
on LinkedIn. Each guesser is trained on the Merged Dataset and
produces two billion guesses.
Table 8 reports the result of our combination attacks. When ID
is combined with any individual guesser (e.g., ID+O, ID+J, etc.), the
combination attacks experience a notable degree of improvement
compared to an individual guesser’s performance (compare the
columns of sole guesser vs. ID + guesser). JtR-Markov experiences
the largest improvement of 18.67%. Even guessers with high success
rates (e.g., NN and PCFGv4) realize improvements of 1% to 4%.
By dramatically increasing the success rate of weaker guessers
(e.g., OMEN and JTR-Markov), this combined approach makes less
resource intensive guessers more competitive.
As shown in Table 8, when more guessers are combined with
the Identity guesser, the success rate increases, but with diminish-
ing returns. For example, compare J to J+S (+7.562%), J+S to J+S+P
(+3.359%), and J+S+P to J+S+P+N (+1.991%). There seems to be two
factors in determining which additional guesser can improve an
existing combination attack the most: the success rate of the candi-
date guesser, and its successful guessing similarities with each of
the combined guessers. A candidate guesser with higher success
rate has more potential to improve the combined guesser (e.g., com-
pare O+J to O+S). However, a candidate guesser with low successful
guessing similarities can be a more effective addition. This interplay
of success rate and successful guessing similarities might make a
less successful guesser with lower successful guessing similarities
more attractive. For example, the weaker JtR and stronger Sem
have successful guessing similarities of 0.675 and 0.902 to PCFGv4.
The addition of JtR to the combination attack of ID+P offers more
improvement than the addition of Sem (3.88% vs. 2.71%).
Each additional guesser also incurs higher runtime and resource
requirements. The attacks color-coded green in Table 8 could be
completed within one workday (or 8 hours), whereas the yellow
and red color-coded attacks must be run overnight (within 8-16
hours) and over two weeks, respectively. The neural network is the
largest contributor to runtime in our combinations and also adds
GPU requirements. Interestingly, unlike the sole guesser attacks,
the slower combination attacks don’t always outperform the faster
attacks. For example, the O+J+P attack (65.466%) runs in under 8
hours while S+P (63.866%) and O+S+P (65.250%) take between 13
hours to 2 weeks, and N (64.875%) and O+N (65.241%) take over
2 weeks. This result implies that competitive success rates can be
achieved by the combination of computationally-cheap guessers
with less resources. These combination attacks serve as a competi-
tive alternative for system administrators without access to GPU
resources, or with time constraints to perform reactive checking
(e.g., J+P attack outperforms N while running within a workday
and without GPU resources).
5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our work provides a number of practical recommendations (R1-
R5) for system administrators auditing their password databases.
While our work can be directly applied to reactive checking, it has
a natural extension to proactive checking, as guessers that generate
probability scores for a given password can be applied as password
meters.
R1: Try publicly-available leaked passwords first. Our results
show that an attacker can be relatively successful by applying the
Identity guesser (i.e., the training data of leaked passwords as a
guess list) before considering any advanced guessers. For online
attacks, the Identity guesser along with PCFGv4 outperform more
advanced guessers. For offline attacks, the Identity guesser per-
formed surprisingly well; with only 22 million guesses, on average
it achieved 64% of the success rate of the top offline guesser PCFGv4
with 300 million guesses (see Table 3). Additionally, in our LinkedIn
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Sole Guesser ID + 1 Guesser ID + 2 Guessers ID + 3 Guessers ID + 4 Guessers
guesser guessed guesser guessed guessers guessed guessers guessed guessers guessed guessers guessed guessers guessed
OMEN 35.641% O 52.272% O+J 57.628% J+P 65.038% O+J+S 63.825% O+P+N 67.336% O+J+S+P 66.931%
JtR-M 37.028% J 55.693% O+S 61.536% J+N 65.909% O+J+P 65.466% J+S+P 66.614% O+J+S+N 67.484%
Sem 55.159% S 59.773% O+P 62.907 S+P 63.866% O+J+N 66.199% J+S+N 67.247% O+J+P+N 68.060%
PCFGv4 58.798% P 61.158% O+N 65.241 S+N 66.411% O+S+P 65.260% J+P+N 67.855% O+S+P+N 68.169%
NN 63.145% N 64.876% J+S 63.255% P+N 67.0822% O+S+N 66.705% S+P+N 67.943% J+S+P+N 68.605%
Table 8: The percentage of LinkedIn passwords cracked by an offline attack using the Identity guesser followed by a combina-
tion of guessers, each making two billion guesses. The names of guessers are shortened to their first letters: (P)CFG, (O)MEN,
(N)N, (S)em, and (J)tR-Markov. Each combination attack is color-coded by its sequential runtime for training and guess gener-
ation of its guessers: Green is less than 8 hours (i.e., a workday), yellow is less than 16 hours, and red is over two weeks.
experiments, the Identity guesser, with 67 million guesses, had
75% the success rate of the top guesser NN, with 2 billion guesses
(see Table 7). These experiments strongly suggest that the Iden-
tity guesser can achieve high guessing success rates, comparable
to the top guessers, while using at least an order of magnitude
fewer guesses. Thus, we strongly recommend that leaked password
datasets should be the first priority in password checking. For this
purpose, services such as Have I Been Pwned [24] can be useful.
R2: Apply combinations of guessers. Our results for guessing
similarity show that the majority of guesses produced by each
guesser are unique, even when the underlying approach or success
rate is similar. Even for successful guesses, each tested guesser is
able to crack passwords that others overlook (e.g., Identity guessed
millions of LinkedIn passwords overlooked by other guessers). Our
analysis indicates that no single guesser is able to completely sub-
stitute another, and they can complement each other when used
together. However, some combinations are more effective than oth-
ers. We also show how some combinations of guessers can have
comparably high success rates with lower computing requirements.
For example, in less than 8 hours, Identity + PCFGv4 + JtR-Markov
can achieve a success rate that compares to Identity + NN (which
takes about 2 weeks). Considering both success rate and computing
requirements, our results from targeting LinkedIn passwords sug-
gest that a reasonable strategy is to apply this ordering of guessers:
Identity, PCFGv4, JtR-Markov, Sem, OMEN, NN.
R3: Train with datasets similar to target. Our results show that
when choosing training data, the similarity to the target data is an
important factor. Thus, our dataset similarity metric can be used to
decide on the most effective training dataset. While our proposed
statistics can be applied using any metric of similarity (e.g., Jaccard
index), or set of features, we chose to use actual passwords and
policy-based features. As such, our results reflect similarity based on
the actual passwords and policy-level characteristics (i.e., number
of character classes and length), so a reasonable shorthand is to
select a training dataset with a matching password policy.
R4: Consider using less training data. Using more training data
takes more computing resources and longer training times. Our
results indicate that training dataset size does not correlate with
guessing success rates. Although when sampling from the same
dataset (Twitter), we observed that data size can increase training
effectiveness, the gains between 1 million and 30 million training
passwords are not as large as one might expect. Therefore, if time
or space constraints exist, a reasonable compromise would be to
use a sample of training data from a dataset with high similarity
(such as Twitter in our experiments).
R5:Use generalizable guessers if unsure about similarity.When
there is considerable uncertainty about the similarity of training
data to the target dataset, a better approach would be to use the
most generalizable guessers. Our results indicate that the guessers
ordered from the highest to the lowest generalizablility are: PCFGv4,
NN, Sem, JtR-Markov, OMEN, and lastly Identity.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We provide an in-depth analysis of password guessers, revealing
insights regarding their behaviors and capabilities, and when and
how to use them (both alone and in combination). This work demon-
strates that combinations of computationally-cheap guessers can be
comparably effective tomore resource-intensive guessers. Our work
also allows us to provide a set of evidence-based recommendations
to system administrators who use password checking tools.
Our proposed analytical framework (i.e., various metrics and
statistics) for comparing password guessers and training datasets
can be utilized or extended by practitioners and researchers for
future password studies. Another interesting direction for future
work is to explore how to summarize a large training dataset into
a smaller dataset that trains guessers just as well. Such a smaller
training dataset would decrease training time and aim to maximize
success rate. Another interesting direction is to develop artificial
intelligence algorithms to assist system administrators in finding
optimal combinations of guessers with a maximum success rate
under budgeted time and resource requirements.
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